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The massification of retail finance in the 1980s relied on the successful deployment of automated teller machines 
(ATM) and on-line real-time (OLRT) computing during the 1960s and 1970s. We document how the deployment of 
ATM networks interweaved with the adoption of OLRT computing in Sweden and the UK (alongside a running 
comparison of similar developments in the USA). Low transaction volume and small retail bank networks facilitated 
the early adoption of OLRT by savings banks in America. Although they started their computerisation rather ‘late’, 
British savings banks benefited from adopting ‘tried and tested’ technology while overtaking clearing banks. 
Meanwhile, Swedish savings banks spearheaded technological change in Europe. In documenting cases of 
organizational change in Sweden and the UK, we depart from predominant view that considers the development of 
OLRT in a single move. We put forward the idea that there are specific conditions inside banking organisations that 
require considering on-line (OL) and on-line real-time (OLRT) as two distinct stage of development in adoption of 
computer technology. As a result, we show how in the process of diffusion of OLRT computing enabled the 
transformation of cash dispensers into ATM at the same time that European financial intermediaries were active in 
shaping technological change. 
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1. Introduction 
Cheaper, more reliable second-generation mainframe computers that used transistors, reliable core memory and 
storage in magnetic tape (augmented by random-access disk stores) became available for business applications by 
1960. These computers were also instrumental in the successful migration of infrastructure and knowhow developed 
around the huge SABRE air defence system to real-time business applications that processed many transactions 
simultaneously (Cambell-Kelly 2003, 41). A requirement for which IBM used the term ‘teleprocessing’ included 
airline reservations, bank automation and retail systems (idem). Indeed, in 1965 there were 505 savings and loans 
(S&L) servicing 22 million accounts in the USA.1 East coast S&L had installed 12 on-line systems servicing 3.2 
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million accounts and 62 branches.2 Eight banks with 33 offices and 964,857 accounts took advantage of service 
bureaus supported by NCR 315 machines. At the same time, there were 17 on-line systems on order by the savings 
banks.3 Teleprocessing had made its mark amongst east coast S&L.  
Teleprocessing in European banking was rather slow when compared to developments in the East coast of the 
USA. However, by 1972 things had changed radically. A forecast for top teleprocessing users in 1985 ranked the 
demand from financial services eighth in the USA, while the same forecast for the demand in Spain ranked financial 
services first (Martín Tardío 2009).  The difference in the forecasts suggests that teleprocessing was expected to 
become more popular amongst the large and densely populated retail bank branch networks of European banks than 
amongst the geographically constrained US retail banks. Moreover and according to Sprague (1977, 29), the view of 
US regulators while participating in the creation of an electronic fund transfer system (EFTS) was informed by 
developments in Europe in the mid-1970s, most notably those around cash dispensing by British and Swedish 
savings banks.  
This paper, therefore, documents in greater depth the development of teleprocessing networks by British and 
Swedish savings banks. Exploring the creation of is relevant because establishing on-line, real-time systems (OLRT) 
by retail European financial intermediaries developed in tandem with the deployment of automated teller machines 
(ATM). These two developments were linked because a lack of over-draft facilities required savings banks to 
develop interconnection between computer centres so that cash machines could debit customer accounts without 
human intervention. In documenting cases in Sweden and the UK, we depart from predominant view in computer 
history that considers the development of OLRT in a single move. We put forward the idea that on-line (OL) and on-
line real-time (OLRT) should be seen as two stage of development of the deployment of computer technology. 
Furthermore, documenting the move from OL to OLRT systems enables us to contrast and compare organizational 
changes within British and Swedish savings banks. As a result, we show how in the process of diffusion of OLRT 
computing and cash dispensers, European financial intermediaries were active in shaping technological change. 
The reminder of this paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides some background regarding the 
origins and growth of savings banks in Britain and Sweden. The third section details the adoption of OLRT 
computing and cash machines in British savings banks. The fourth section documents similar developments in 
Sweden. In document the adoption of OLRT and ATM networks in Britain and Sweden we show that these 
developments intertwined with those of two engineering companies namely Speytec (that was to be purchased by 
Burroughs) in the UK and Metior (later to be Asea-Metior) in Sweden. The fifth and final section encompasses our 
conclusions. 
 
2. Common Origins 
2.1. Trustee Savings Banks 
Savings banks date to 1810 in Scotland from where they expanded to other European nations during the 19th 
century while building around ideas about creating thrift habits within the proletariat (Horne 1947). There were 
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different forms of savings banks in the UK (including the National Security Savings Bank system and the Post 
Office Savings Bank, later called National Savings Bank) but our research only deals with that with the largest 
number of similar organisations, namely the so called trustee savings bank (TSB).  
The governance of the TSB was different to other corporate bodies because there was no ultimate owner, while 
proceeds were usually reinvested in their totally as working capital. To create trust among potential depositors, the 
Savings Bank (England) Act 1817 required all such institutions to deposit their accumulated funds with the 
Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, who held an account at the Bank of England (thus providing 
cast-iron security) for this purpose (Horne, 1947: 72). The same principles were extended to Scottish savings banks 
in 1835. Guarantees to depositors introduced by Act of 1817 were reinstated in subsequent legislation (enacted in 
1833, 1863 and 1891) (Payne, 1967).  
Early attempts at market diversification were curtailed by the Savings Bank Act of 1891. It was until 1965 that 
the TSB were allowed to issue current accounts, undertake the payment of utility bills and safeguard securities and 
valuables. Regulatory changes, therefore, limited the potential diversification of the British savings banks’ 
investment portfolio and foreclose opportunities for direct lending to retail customers while their business remained 
in collecting low volume deposits. Funds and operation of the savings banks would be under control of voluntary 
managers or trustees (hence the roots of the TSB acronym), none of whom was to derive any benefit from that office 
(Maixé-Altés 2009).  
At the end of nineteenth century there were 231 TSB banks in UK (Horne 1947, 388). This number was 
reduced through a number of mergers while most remained as a series of autonomous entities, many of them ‘unit 
banks’ (where the whole organization was encapsulated within the premises of a single retail office) as late as 1970.  
At the same time, some trustee savings banks began to open retail branches and sub-branches. Some of these came 
from converting premises of ‘savings centers’ into actual branches, tried for the first time in Gloucester in 1948.4 
But by and large most of the branches came from organic developments in close geographical proximity to ‘head 
office’ – thus responding to changes in local economic conditions while avoiding the sphere of action of another 
savings bank.5 The emergence of a retail branch network for the whole movement was timid in terms of the number 
of retail outlets: with 386 in 1911, reaching 1,505 in 1970 (30 for the Preston bank and 37 for the Belfast Bank)6 and 
peaking at 1,650 in 1981.7 New and refitted branches would always be inaugurated with a ‘social bang’, as the 
opening accompanied with ‘an impressive civic opening ceremony.’8  
In 1960 the distribution of the number of banks and size of assets was highly skewed with the North of England 
and Scotland having the largest number of banks and accounts, the largest banks in terms of assets located in urban 
centres (namely London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Belfast), the largest concentration of assets located in the South 
East of England (Revell 1973, 355-356; Bátiz-Lazo and Del Angel 2003, 355). At the same time, the share of total 
deposits in sterling made by UK residents was diminishing from 9.2 percent in 1962 (£16.5 million) to 6.2 percent in 
1976 (£69.8m) (CLCB 1978, 56). As part of a change of government policy, 70 or so remaining banks amalgamated 
into a single provider between 1970 and 1985. This entity was then floated in the stock exchange following 
Thatcher’s privatization program in 1986 while given its unique governance, the proceeds of the flotation were 
reinvested in its entirety as working capital. Nine years later, the TSB Group was acquired by Lloyds Bank in 1995. 
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2.2. The Swedish savings banks – a brief overview 
The first Swedish savings banks were inspired by the Scottish model and established in the early nineteenth 
century. These banks were non-profit organisations with the purpose to encourage thrift among poor people. 
However, from the start a large portion of deposits came from farmers and the urban middle-class. The passing of 
the first piece of legislation dealing with savings banks in 1892, stated that savings banks were to gather deposits 
from the general public and not only from the poor. Regarding the loan portfolio, the savings banks were mainly 
focused on investments in housing, real estate and agriculture. The first savings banks were established in towns and 
cities, but the movement spread to the countryside in the late nineteenth century. The number of savings banks 
increased rapidly until 1926 when they reached a peak of 497.9 Although all savings banks were under the same 
regulation, there were clear differences between units operating in towns, at the county-level or in the countryside 
(Forsell 2002, 75-77). 
The Swedish savings banks association (Svenska sparbanksföreningen) was established in 1900, some ten years 
after similar organisations had been established in the UK (1887) and the US (1893) but ahead of those in Spain 
(1928), Italy (1911) and France (circa 1960). Like its US and Spanish counterparts, the Swedish association played 
an important role in elevating the public image of thrift and from the 1920s onwards, lobby government on behalf of 
its members.10 In 1925 a department for propaganda was established. According to Hessling (1990, 68-69), this 
department had three main aims: first, it was to encourage thrift, both internally within the savings banks and 
externally among the public. Second, it was to serve as a publishing house and, third, as a central purchasing unit to 
coordinate purchases of material that the savings bank needed in their retail branches. The department regularly 
published printed material and was responsible for launching national campaigns. In 1941 the propaganda 
department was re-named Sparfrämjandet and in 1943 it became an independent company. One reason behind the 
change of name was the negative connotation of the term ‘propaganda’. The new Sparfrämjandet had three 
departments namely, publishing, external relations and central purchasing. 
 The co-ordinating structure of the savings banks movement was further enlarged in 1942 with the creation of a 
central bank for the savings banks (Sparbankernas bank)  (Forsell 2002, 77-78; Körberg 2006). This organisation 
was a similar to those already operating in other European countries namely, Finland (Skopbank, established in 
1908) and Norway (Fellesbanken established in 1919) in Scandinavia. In continental Europe there were the likes of 
ICCRI in Italy (established in 1919) and the Spanish Savings Banks Credit Institute (Instituto de Crédito de las 
Cajas de Ahorro or ICCA, established in 1933). But the Swedish move was ahead of that in Great Britain, where the 
Central Trustee Savings Bank Ltd. was established until 1972 to amalgamate clearing operations in England and 
Scotland and co-ordinate money transmission between all savings banks  (Moss and Slaven 1992, 163; Moss and 
Russell 1994, 275).  
During the first half of the twentieth century competition between savings banks and commercial banks in 
Sweden was rather weak. Each had different customers and offered different services. In some instances they even 
came together to collaborate in joint projects. Whereas the commercial banks had experienced serious problems 
during the inter-war period, savings banks flourished while operating mainly in local and regional markets. 
Although their number had already started a downtrend (approaching 450 in 1945 and as little as 60 in 2008),  
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jointly their share of total deposits increased from 26 to 43 percent between 1920 and 1950 and profits were high 
(Forsell 2002, 78-79). 
The decades that followed the end of World War II were characterized by overall economic growth, 
increased affluence and expansion of the welfare state in Sweden. This era also saw increased competition in the 
banking sector as the commercial banks began to widen their customer base (while aiming to attract all sorts of new 
customers, from companies to wage-earners). Handelsbanken, for example, launched itself as the ‘people’s bank’ in 
1950. Shortly after it and other commercial banks used the contacts developed while financing the working capital 
of manufacturing companies to offer these companies direct payroll deposit services.  
The savings banks were initially hesitating to this new service but there was a group of younger managers 
that pushed for a more aggressive corporate strategy (Forsell 2002, 78-79, 89; Körberg 2006, 232-233). Throughout 
the 1950s these young managers were under the leadership of Sven G Svensson, director of Sparfrämjandet, who 
also organised annual conferences in the resort town of Saltsjöbaden (in the Stockholm archipelago) to facilitate the 
meeting of like-minded young managers (Forsell 2002, 88-89). They were united by the idea that the savings banks 
had to adjust to ongoing social change. Furthermore, they had the conviction that the savings banks should met the 
challenge of Handelsbanken and other commercial banks but not by demanding protection from the state but by 
introducing better services. Many ideas that came out of the conferences at Saltsjöbaden were implemented during 
the 1960s as the attendants reached influential positions within the savings banks.11 As a result the Swedish savings 
banks evolved from small-scale savings institutions to ‘modern’ business-oriented banks. During this process the 
emphasis on thrift was downplayed while the savings banks began to view depositors more like customers than 
savers.  
Rocketing administrative costs provided a strong incentive for the savings banks to seek greater labour 
efficiency through the application of new technologies. As suggested by Table 1, the increase in the nominal value 
of deposits was accompanied by an increase in the value of administrative costs (measured as a percent of total 
deposits). It is around this background that they intensified efforts to introduce mainframe computers for various 
tasks during the 1960s. 
 
Table 1: Administration costs in the 80 biggest Swedish savings banks, 1962-1967 
 
Year Million SEK % of deposits 
1962 114 0.847 
1963 128 0.895 
1964 150 0.963 
1965 176 1.063 
1966 213 1.124 
1967 257 1.194 
 
Source: Körberg (2006, 211) 
 
As mentioned, the savings banks were late to respond to the direct payment of payroll service offered by 
commercial banks. This was to change in 1960 when most of the bigger savings bank introduced that service. But 
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unfortunately the number of individual accounts they managed to attract proved to be much lower than expected. 
This became evident two years later in 1962, when the commercial banks had more than twice as many accounts as 
the savings banks (respectively 387,000 against 143,000). However, close links with trade unions helped the savings 
banks to transform their position and eventually dominate the direct payroll payment service. By the end of 1970 the 
savings banks had no less 870,000 accounts (Hessling 1990, 239; Forsell 2002, 78-79, 89). At the same time, the 
number of Ordinary Department accounts in the British savings banks increased 16 percent from 8,635,637 in 1962 
to 9,980,000 in 1967 (Moss and Russell 1994, 326). Table 2 below illustrates how the growth in business volume 
was accompanied with an increase in staff in Sweden. Meanwhile, staff numbers were also rising in the UK, 
reaching 17,070 in 1980 and peaking at 43,640 in 1989.12  
 
 
Table 2: Estimated number of employees and deposits in Swedish savings banks, 1962-1967 
 
Year Number of 
employees 
Increase in % Deposits million 
SEK 
Increase in % 
1962 3,500  17,699  
1963 4,100 17 18,957 7 
1964 4,700 15 20,531 8 
1965 5,200 11 22,263 8 
1966 5,800 12 24,511 10 
1967 6,400 10 27,259 11 
 
Source: Körberg (2006, 211) 
 
While increased involvement in direct deposit of payroll reduced the number of cheques passing through 
the banking system, the savings banks found this involvement was not without costs. In order to keep up with the 
commercial banks, the savings banks had to expand their workforce. This resulted in payroll and related costs 
growing faster than the pace at which the value of total deposits increased. Consequently, administration costs 
bolted. Expressed as a share of deposits, administration costs increased by 40 percent between 1962 and 1967. Table 
3 below summarises a closer study of the four largest savings banks. It revealed that the number of transactions 
(withdrawals and deposits) increased by 125 percent, whereas their total funds increased by 64 percent (Körberg 
2006, 210-212). At the same time, the nominal value of deposits at the Ordinary Department of the British savings 
banks increased 67 percent from £823,800,000 in 1962 to £1,377,700,000 in 1967; while withdrawals increased 71 
percent from £830,100,000 in 1962 to £1,417,900,000 in 1967 (Moss and Russell 1994, 327). These figures suggest 
that the relative success of Swedish banks was not matched by the British, as the TSB were losing deposits faster 







Table 3: Transaction volume and deposits in four biggest Swedish savings banks, 1962-1967 
 
Year Number of deposits and 
withdrawals 
Value of deposits in million SEK 
1962 2,011,600 989 
1963 3,077,600 1,062 
1964 3,528,900 1,147 
1965 3,843,300 1,246 
1966 4,473,000 1,425 
1967 4,526,700 1,626 
 
Source: Körberg (2006, 212) 
 
 
Another aspect of the modernization of the Swedish savings banks that took place in the 1960 was 
concentration. In the beginning of the 1960 there were still over 400 individual savings banks in Sweden. As a result 
of amalgamation between small units operating in the countryside and city-based ones, only 273 savings banks 
remained in 1970. The concentration process went on in the following decades with merges between the biggest 
banks. By 1989 there were 109 savings banks left, but this population consisted of 20 big banks with regional 
coverage that had 80 percent of total deposits and 95 local banks (Forsell 2002, 101).  
 
3. Catching up and Overtaking in England 
3.1. Development of On-Line Systems 
The nature of operations in retail financial intermediation had conceptualised the need for on-line systems 
in banking since early in the process of their computerization. This was evident in the pioneering effort of the 
Howard Savings Institutions of Newark, New Jersey which in 1953 began a study into the feasibility of automation 
for savings and mortgages operations. However, off-the shelf equipment at the time was found to be inadequate and 
‘[s]econd, the problem was similar to that of the military system development with specified performance without 
specified hardware types.’ (Sanders 1963, 708). Unable to find a computer provider whose system could guarantee 
the level of reliability and security required to keep customers satisfied (and the costs of the configuration within 
reason), the Howard had to wait almost 10 years to see a system that linked 32 ‘teller-registers’ (counter terminals in 
all seven retail branches of the bank) with a central processing unit at head office. By 1965 two other banks (Union 
Dime Savings Bank, NY and Society for Savings, Hartford, Conn.) adopted the Teleregister system.13 The 
Teleregister system then serviced a combination of 22 retail branches and 710,865 accounts.14  
American savings and co-operative banks also use bureau services to solve their computer requirements. 
Located in Boston, MA, Bankers Data Processing, Inc. was heralded as a ‘precedent-setting’ development for US 
retail financial services. 15 Established in 1963 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Boston-based Provident 
Institution, two years later it had deployed passbook on-line processing terminals at the counter of 19 branches of 
seven banks. On-line terminals eliminated the need for ledger cards by automating the credit and debit of passbooks 
(including accrued interest) while speeding up services to individual customers and the balancing of individual 
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tellers at the end of the day. Installing a Burroughs B300 in September 1965 aimed to expand on-line terminals to 18 
other savings banks in Massachusetts while using conventional telephone lines to bring on-line 44 separate offices to 
serve some 500,000 customers. At the time, the Bankers Data Processing’s system was claimed to be not only the 
first bureau service for savings institutions but also the largest of its kind ordered or installed anywhere in the world. 
But in spite of developments to automate passbook-based accounts in the USA, in Britain savings banks 
were ‘late’ adopters of computer technology (Bátiz-Lazo and Maixé-Altés 2009b). Their preference was to purchase 
‘tried and tested’ devices while making little or no advertising of this; whereas British clearing banks were keen to 
advertise the adoption of new machinery as a sign of ‘modernity’ (Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley 2007). While clearing 
banks developed computer expertise in-house (notably amongst accounting and the operation and methods 
departments), savings banks recruited heavily from the market and notably engineers with experience in on-line 
systems such as airlines and television.  
Early experiments took place by banks established in and around London. These banks developed a 
clearing centre in Surrey in the early 1960s around an IBM 1400, but the big incentive to bring the computer 
revolution to all the TSB was the decimalization of sterling in 1971(Bátiz-Lazo and Maixé-Altés 2009b). While 
clearing banks had already installed a number of computer installations by the mid-1960s, the mechanisation of the 
British savings banks was largely incipient: most TSB had just started to use mechanical and electro-mechanical 
equipment to speed up internal processes such as the accounting function (idem).   
A speedy computerization using a bureau service was a particularly attractive idea as it would help to deal 
with the cost of capital investment and the lack of technical skills. Most English and Welsh banks mapped to a 
bureau service supported by the National Data Processing Service (NDPS), a subsidiary of the Post Office. After 
decimalization, operations were brought in-house and replaced by nine processing centres servicing 48 banks and 
some 1,550 retail bank branches: Manchester or MADCAP (6 banks); West Midlands-Kidderminster (6 banks); 
Bottle near Liverpool (8 banks); York (14 banks); Crawley in West Sussex (near Surrey, 5 banks); London (3 
banks); Glasgow (4 banks); Belfast and north of Edinburgh in Falkirk (Moss and Russell 1994, 266).  
As the TSB amalgamated into a single entity, the TSB managed to maintain heterogeneity across banks in 
administrative processes and other computer related applications (Bátiz-Lazo and Maixé-Altés 2009a). Indeed, early 
in their computerization, the banks around Manchester and the West Midlands-Kidderminster consortia committed 
to having their own computer centre running the same configuration system (built around an ICL System 4).16 
Expertise developed around these banks and particularly that in Manchester was to spear head technological and 
organizational change for all the TSB.  
The roots of the development of on-line, real-time (OLRT) systems at the TSB took place in September 
1970. On this date Tom Bryans, general manager of the Belfast Savings Bank (with assets of £124 million was the 
third in the UK and largest in Ireland), unveiled the first on-line (OL) system applied to a savings bank operation in 
Britain and Ireland.17 The system brought together the savings banks of Northern Ireland and was based on the 
combination of an undisclosed Burroughs mainframe and TC700 terminals.18 Initially these were to service 40,000 
of the Irish consortium’s 560,000 deposit accounts and provide instantaneous communication to 26 of the 42 retail 
branches. 
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Also in 1970 the Manchester and District Bank built a computer centre in Strangeways (Sale, Greater 
Manchester) and called it Manchester and District Computer Accounting Project (MADCAP). One of the banks 
serviced by MADCAP was the Manchester and Salford Savings Bank whose Chief Accountant was David Wilson. 
Wilson served in the war in the telecommunications regiment where he had been involved in operating the radar 
systems.  It was from this experience that he became interested in communications. During the first stage of 
computerization of the TSB, transactions at the branches were collated into paper tape at regional offices and then 
processed overnight at NDPS machines. Wilson understood that this form of batch processing was breaking the law 
as it required that information on the passbook to match that in the bank’s ledger. Wilson thus wanted to develop 
some form of communication where the computer record was updated immediately as the transaction took place at 
the retail branch’s teller.  
At that point in time, having small computers in branch offices with the purpose of updating accounts was 
simply too expensive.  Wilson kept coming round to the idea and then suggested to neighbouring banks about 
sharing the cost of one big central computer that would eventually hook the terminals at retail branches through 
telephones. That was how MADCAP was born.  MADCAP went on-line in November 1971 while the West 
Midlands consortia did it successfully in 1972. Thus the TSB were defeating similar initiatives by the clearing banks 
– which as late as the mid-1980s still operated balances ‘as of last night’. Of course there were important differences 
between the TSB and the clearing banks: while the TSB had 1,524 retail branches in 1971, Lloyds Bank (the 
smallest of the big four clearing banks in terms of assets) had 2,384 retail branches and 34,368 employees in the 
UK.19 Moreover, although the savings banks had large number of accounts, there were neither a great number of 
transactions not were there many different types of transaction (Moss and Russell 1994, 271). As it turned out, more 
than fifty standing order payments per account stretch the system to its limits (idem). However, at that point in time, 
only Lloyds had seriously approached the idea of an OLRT system, while the other three large clearing banks (i.e. 
Barclays, NatWest, Midland) had at least a decade before they brought all retail branches on-line. 
The eight bank consortia went on-line in 1974 and the North-East and Midlands the following year (Moss 
and Russell 1994, 271). But this resulted in mixture of on-line, off-line and manual systems: the London Saving 
Bank had abandoned its plans to go on-line while the Scottish banks, serviced through the Savings Banks of 
Glasgow, remained committed to their Burroughs off-line system as still more cost-effective than available OLRT 
systems while the Northern Ireland TSB, using Burroughs computers, refused to join the larger Altrincham-based 
consortia with ICL machines (Moss and Russell 1994, 282).  Unable to secure a single national system, the chairman 
of TSB Computer Services, speaking at the Association’s annual meeting in May 1975, cautioned that clearing 
banks were taking the advantage in on-line technology (idem). Shortly after, in late 1975, Tom Bryans, of the 
computer-pioneer of the Belfast bank, was named the first chief general manager of the TSB. 
Well aware of the challenge, the four consortia using Altrincham and the South-West off-line consortium 
were determined to press ahead with a replacement system based on a single OLRT system housed at computer 
centre in Wythenshawe (built in 1979) (idem).  At the time, no-one in the banking and the computer marketplace 
believed in the proposal to switch from an on-line system based on the ICL system 4 mainframe and Olivetti 
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terminals at the counter to an OLRT system built around a Sperry Univac and 3,500 Burroughs modular transaction 
control terminals (spread out at the counter of some 1,000 retail branches) without breaking the system.20   
Few outside of the TSB technical area believe it possible. A manager in charge of the joint computer centre 
recalls: ‘IBM’s attitude was you can’t do it.  IBM wanted us to stop our system and transfer everything across to a 
new system off-line.’(Read, 17-Jul-2008). Moreover, a report on the ‘cost-effectiveness and human aspects of 
computerization’ commission to a group of academics by the TSB considered that the OLRT system would be more 
expensive than the off-line alternative (Moss and Russell 1994, 272). However, the view of computer specialist 
inside the TSB was that both the report and the market place were overlooking the productivity gains that could be 
achieved. 
As mentioned in preparation for decimalization the TSB introduced Olivetti terminals sitting directly in 
counters, which allowed the input of information at the point of origin in the branches. This was solid ground to 
deploy the OLRT system based on the Burroughs terminals. The new system allowed providing information based 
on real-time interrogation of the data. One contemporary observer in the US opined that the computer success of the 
TSB was noteworthy to the extent that:  
‘The TSB ...  [has] one of the most advanced on-line networks serving both teller windows and ATM’s in 
the U.K. Competition is doing very well in all parts of the United Kingdom and the clearing banks are in 
for some rude shocks unless they awaken to the situation.’(Sprague 1977, 31). 
To gain such praise, the TSB first had to close down of regional computer centres while making that in 
Wythenshawe service all branches. For security purposes, operations at Wythenshawe were duplicated with a 
second (dedicated) centre at Milton Keynes. Perhaps as a legacy of the Cold War, tapes, transaction logs and other 
back-ups were taken daily to a third back up site, whose location was ‘secret’ (but suspected to be located in 
Rowntrees in York) which assured the TSB would be operational in spite of ‘an attack’. The centre in Milton 
Keynes was built in 1983 with the double purpose of, first, providing a back up to the computer at Wythenshawe but 
also amalgamating activities of the south east of England (which until then had remained off-line) with those in 
Wythenshawe (which already had within its remit operations in the North East, North of Wales, Cornwall and 
Devon).21  
By 1983, the TSB were the only British bank to have managed to capture information as and when 
transactions actually occurred and there was no evidence other banks would be able to do it in the near term (Rajan 
1984, 56). Shortly after, the government published a White Paper and a new TSB Bill in 1984. Together these 
resulted in abandoning the quasi-federal decentralised structure in favour of a central organisation which was no-
longer legally unique but incorporated under the Companies Act. The aim was to give the then called TSB Group ‘a 
more effective operating structure and also establish clear guidelines for ownership and accountability, neither of 
which was clear under former legislation.’ (Marshall 1985, 41). Also in 1984, England and Wales amalgamated into 
a single organisation an all remaining off-line branches linked to the Wythenshawe/Milton Keynes computers. The 
same happened in 1985 when the TSB became a single entity when joined by the Scottish banks (whose branches 
had also remained largely off-line).22 As a result, the TSB was the only clearing bank in Britain with a fully 
integrated on-line, real-time system when it was floated in the stock exchange in November 1986. 
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3.2. Deploying  the on-line, real-time ATM network 
The introduction of cash dispensing technology to the TSB took place when the West Midland made 
operational a Chubb MD2 at the Shrewsbury branch in June 1970.23 Chubb & Son’s Lock and Safe Company Group 
plc. (Chubb) had been one of the pioneering firms of cash dispensing technology in the UK thanks to its 
collaboration with Smith Industries and two large clearing banks, namely Westminster Bank and Midland Bank 
(Bátiz-Lazo and Reid 2008, 2-3). The MD2 was a standalone machine where customer’s record had to be updated 
after the transaction and with mediation of a human teller. The West Midland’s adoption of an MD2 followed 
similar moves by the clearing banks at the same time that Chubb became the dominant technology in British retail 
finance during the early 1970s (Bátiz-Lazo 2009, 7-8).   
In an independent move and four years after installing its Burroughs mainframe in 1970, the first two ‘on-
line’ (OL) cash dispensers (Burroughs RT 2000) were made operational in Belfast in 1974.24 Here OL meant that the 
central computer was informed of withdrawals after the cash had been dispensed as otherwise the transaction would 
have been too time consuming for the customer. There were no opportunities to confirm availability of funds prior to 
dispensing the cash.  
But neither of these two early experiments seems to have had widespread repercussions amongst the TSB. 
Instead the roots of what Sprague (1977, 31) described as the ‘first community wide ATM network’ in the UK dated 
to the deployment of MADCAP’s English Electric (ie ICL) System 4 mainframe.25 Around 1970, David Wilson 
pointed out to the programmers that communication between the mainframe and its Olivetti terminals (sitting on the 
counter of retail branches) would be 10, 20 or even 30 miles away and then back again. In the absence of random 
access memory and database management systems, they came up with ‘Modus 11’. This was not encryption but a 
mathematical calculation that converted the account number to a specific address on the file on the disc. In this way, 
a specific query resulting from a passbook inserted into a teller terminal could go straight in and straight out.  
‘Modus 11’ then became the key for a trial system of 10 Chubb cash dispensers. After having seen 
developments in London and in the USA, it was decided that one of the ‘on-line’ banks would move forward with 
the project. The General Manager of which was now the Manchester Regional Area Central Bank, volunteered. 
There was an advantage on the trial being in Manchester because that was where the computer centre was located. 
However, the selection of Chubb as provider of the cash dispensing equipment followed Harold Wilson’s and Tony 
Benn’s ‘buy British’ policy rather than technical specifications and preferences of the TSB’s computer staff.  
The first experiment with OLRT cash dispensers took place in 1974 (Moss and Russell 1994, 282). This 
first trial involved six branches wired to the Manchester computer centre.26 Initially there were greater issues in 
making the Chubb machines work than the communication using conventional telephone lines. Shortly after, 
customers who had an account in the Manchester Regional Area could make withdrawals from these cash 
dispensers. Customers were no longer tied to their specific bank or branch. They could withdraw from any cash 
machine and their account debited immediately. Customers could also make balance enquiries. 
But in spite of the success with the trial adoption elsewhere within the savings banks was slow. As late as 
1978, only few retail branches were equipped with a currency dispensing apparatus. Although some other banks also 
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installed Chubb cash dispensers, when the TSB wanted to embrace this technology in full it found that Chubb was 
unable to supply the machines (Neil, 16 March 2008). Moreover, there was resistance from the South region and 
resistance from Scotland, banks who were all on off-line systems.  This was to change in 1979 when the South-East 
Regional Area ordered from Burroughs two B6800 large-scale computer system and 800 TD730 display terminals 
worth $7 million dollars.27  
Managers had also resisted deployment on the grounds of cost as they thought that cash dispensing 
technology was expensive. Indeed, in 1977 a top of the line RT 5000 Burroughs cash dispenser (a direct competitor 
of the IBM 3624 and featuring printer and up to 4,000 bills of one or two denominations) ranged from $25,000 to 
$40,000 each (or a rent ranging from $860 to $1,400 per month based on a one year contract).28 Moreover, an 
internal cost accounting exercise at the TSB suggested that cash dispensing technology would be ineffective unless 
it was strongly associated with a sharp decrease in the number of transactions though and off the teller’s counter. 
The situation remained at an impasse until the end of 1978, when two of the leading clearing banks (namely 
Barlcays and NatWest) were actively deploying large orders of NCR 770 cash machines (Bátiz-Lazo 2009). TSB 
managers then panicked and pressed for cash dispensers to be rolled out throughout all regions.  
Research into potential providers to service by the TSB by the Computer Research and Development Unit 
(CRDU) resulted in a large order of Burroughs cash machines being placed. This order was placed in spite of some 
senior managers thinking that Burroughs was not the better technology (Neil, 16 March 2008). The architecture of 
the Burroughs cash dispensers built on the system developed by specifications of the Midland Bank to a small 
engineering firm called Speytec (Bátiz-Lazo and Reid 2008). Speytec became a subsidiary of Burroughs in 1969 but 
as the following quote suggests the US computer manufacturer was keen in keeping the custom of British financial 
intermediaries:   
 ‘… they went away and came back with another machine. It was the RT650. [We thought of it as] the TSB’s 
because [Burroughs] modified it to work with us. The beauty about it was it was a very simple machine.  We 
looked at NCR and they had an excellent machine but it was too sophisticated to talk to the system we were 
operating, we wanted something simple the system would do it straight the way you see and it was a bit more 
expensive so that was put aside.’ (Taylor, 17 July 2008). 
As stated in the quote, Burroughs was happy to modify its equipment to suit the workings of TSB computer 
and administrative procedures (while marketing the RT659 to US banks from 1981 onwards). But as a result of the 
modifications, the day to day operation of the RT650 was not a challenge for human tellers at the TSB.29 See Figure 
















Source: Charles Babbage Institute (CBI), Burroughs Corporation Records (Ascension 90), Product Photographs, ca. 
1940-1985 (Series 75), Box 43, Folder 6.  
 












Source: Charles Babbage Institute (CBI), Burroughs Corporation Records (Ascension 90), Product Photographs, ca. 
1940-1985 (Series 75), Box 43, Folder 6.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, human tellers operated the machine through a back door. Here the machine stored 
a big tally roll (which later models replaced with magnetic tape cassettes and floppy disks), in which details of each 
transaction were recorded. Each morning the dispenser was refilled (always using new notes as otherwise they 
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would get stuck or cause the machine to malfunction) and the printed record balanced. This procedure was exactly 
the same as that used to balance tills serviced by human tellers. So after a brief explanation, any of the cashiers was 
able to service the cash dispenser for the purpose of routine transactions.  
Currency dispensing worked well once individual customers overcame their fear of the activating card not 
being return or had a dislike for interacting with a machine rather than human teller. There were of course instances 
where the cash card would slip through the wrong slot or the machine failed to dispense the right amount (something 
easily solved if the customer returned at the end of the working day and the balance in the machine equal the amount 
he/she claimed had not been dispensed.) But largely, during the early 1980s, the Burroughs cash dispensers seem to 
have been free of associating with specific errors or malfunctions – illustrating how the TSB benefited from 
adopting a tried and tested technology after clearing banks had to endure ‘teething problems’ with early forms of 
currency dispensers.  
 In summary, the TSB became the first UK retail financial institution to have a full OLRT system. Through this 
process the savings banks created the largest network of computers and introduced leading edge software 
applications for fraud detection and management of cash machines (while replacing Burroughs RT650 with NCR 
1780 equipment in the 1980s). British savings banks, therefore, explored cost efficient ways of using readily 
available technology that could sit on top of scarce resources to attract the inflow of deposits from geographically 
remote customers. This included opening of retail branches by the largest banks. But tight regulation and under-
developed strategic and risk management skills amongst the top echelons of management, limited possibilities but 
for a handful of individual organizations in this constellation reaching critical scale to compete. 
 
4. Shaping technology in Sweden 
4.1. Establishing joint on-line systems around Spadab 
Rising administrative costs and an increasing number of accounts in the late 1950s and the 1960s required Swedish 
savings banks to take urgent action. According to Körberg (2006), the savings banks of Stockholm and Gothenburg 
were the only two with the size and business volume to justify investment in punched card sorter-readers in the 
1950s. These two savings banks also were the only two to invest in that technology. By the end of the 1950s, it was 
common to see the use of mechanical and electro-mechanical accounting machines amongst the Swedish savings 
banks.  
Sparfrämjandet dealt with most technical questions for the savings banks. At Sparfrämjandet, the 
department for central purchasing was that which decided which technical equipment should be bought. Almost 
every savings bank was a member of Sparfrämjandet and although Sparfrämjandet’s central purchasing department 
only issued recommendations about specific equipment and its use, savings banks who failed to follow these 
recommendations were reprimanded. The Swedish savings banks association had a committee to design paper 
forms. This committee effectively controlled the use and design of paper forms across the whole movement. The 
savings banks association also had technical advisers that primarily visited small and mid-sized savings banks and 
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helped them with decisions on and management of technical matters. At the Nordic level, there was also co-
operation that included technical matters. This co-operation was named Nordic Central Savings banks Delegation 
(NCSD). In the late 1950s computerization of bookkeeping was something that was discussed within this group. 
A major step towards computerization was taken in 1958 when a Technical Committee was formed within 
the Swedish savings banks association. The committee was formed after Hans-Erik Wihlborg, who was to become 
the first chairman of the committee, led a delegation to the USA in 1957. Their aim was to observe the use of what 
they called electronic computing machines by savings and loans banks. Wihlborg’s report recommended that similar 
machines might be useful for the Swedish savings banks but within a time frame of five to ten years. One of the 
participants from the trip even said that “there is, however, reason to be sceptical whether these systems will work as 
supposed”(Körberg 2006, 203).  
Per Olov Rimvall, another member of the Technical Committee, was a driving force behind research to 
solve the ‘bookkeeping problem’ in the savings banks and to find a common solution to the problem. Among the 
issues he face was widespread scepticism towards the idea that a great number of savings banks could work together 
on solving technical issue and making joint capital equipment investments.  
In 1959 Wihlborg left the savings banks movement to be employed at Svenska Handelsbanken. As a result 
Rimvall took the position as chairman of the Technical Committee. Rimvall’s first decision was to form a sub-
committee within the Technical Committee that had the task of automating bookkeeping. The sub-committee started 
their work in 1960 and they scanned the market for suppliers of computing machines and got quotes from IBM, 
Ericsson, Bull, RCA and NCR. At this point time, most of the major commercial banks had already purchased 
computers. while some savings banks had started to use private computer service bureaus. The work of the sub-
committee led in late 1961 to the formation of commonly owned computer and data processing company, which 
later was to be called Spadab. 
Spadab’s first large investment took place when a computer centre in Stockholm opened for service in early 
1963. It housed a Bull Gamma 30 computer. The Stockholm computer centre was soon followed by a second centre 
in Gothenburg.  Although some people at Spadab pushed hard for the purchase of an RCA machine at Gothenburg, 
in the end Bull once again secured the installation of another Gamma 30. Only some months after the decision was 
made the merger between Bull Sweden and RCA Sweden were announced (Spadab 1987). By the end of 1963, 16 
savings banks used the Stockholm computer centre and 15 banks the centre in Gothenburg. A third computer centre 
was also opened in the south at Linkoping. Each computer centre was sub-divided into three main areas: the 
mainframe room, the punching room and a room for the distribution unit. 
Although the Stockholm Savings Bank had developed its own computing facilities, it joined Spadab in 
1966 while, at the same time, becoming the fourth computing centre of the Swedish consortia. By then, the 
computer centres had a dual organizational structure: while mainframes were located close to large urban centres of 
important economic activity, staff involved in systems development, system analysis and programming were all 
housed in Stockholm.  
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A fifth and last centre was opened in Malmö in 1967. The engineering group in Malmö had done some 
explorations around computer technology outside of Spadab. For instance, it pioneered the use of on-line services 
and the first on-line cash dispenser was installed in August 1968. The centre in Malmö was fitted with a third 
generation computer, namely a new IBM 360/40 was installed which had on-line teller terminals sitting in the 
counters of retail branches. The IBM machine was also connected to NCR cash machines. Interesting to note that 
one terminal offered the possibility to get automated voice responses to questions that were typed in. The terminals 
were connected through conventional telephone lines using 1,200 baud modems. But besides the development at the 
Malmö centre, OLRT services really took off in 1974 when 15 savings banks were connected in a nationwide on-
line network. 
4.2. The Metior cash dispenser 
The roots of cash dispensing technology in the Swedish savings banks resulted from efforts at Sparfrämjandet and 
not Spadab. Sparfrämjandet was the initial driving force for savings banks to adopt cash dispensers because the 
central purchasing department of Sparfrämjandet had a parallel development within automation: in 1960, Hans 
Rausing and the Rausing company started to develop and sell coin sorting machines to the savings banks. This later 
became the firm Restello, a company within the Tetra Pak group.  
The saving banks and Sparfrämjandet had for some years been discussing the possibilities of automating 
cash dispensing to rationalize handling of cash for bank tellers in the bank offices. One other need was to make it 
possible to distribute cash when the bank offices were closed, especially and as had been the case in Britain, after 
the banks closed retail branches on Saturdays in 196X. In contrast to Britain where banks introduced cash dispensers 
in 1967 and then bowed to labour union demands to end Saturday opening hours in 1969 (Bátiz-Lazo 2009, 5 and 
19) , Swedish savings banks first ended service on retail branches on Saturday and then introduced cash dispensers. 
 Sparfrämjandet wanted some type of machine or automat that was able to dispense bank notes and 
discussed the issue with Metior, a company in the Tetra-Pak group that manufactured automatic petrol pumps and 
had taken over production of the Restello coin sorting machines.30 The discussions went on for some time but the 
co-operation was not fully successful. Metior then contacted the commercial bank Svenska Handelsbanken who 
became the new partner in the development of a cash dispenser (Wentzel 1996, XX; Körberg 2006, 348). According 
to Körberg,  Bengt Wetterholm, the CEO of Spadab at that time, reinitiated the contacts with Metior when learning 
about the interest of Svenska Handelsbanken (Metior Archive; Körberg 2006, 348).  
Here it is worth  noting that there are very few references to Spadab in Metior’s archives. It seems like the 
company mainly had contacts with Sparfrämjandet and that it was this organization that influenced the design of the 
first generations of cash dispensers in Sweden. For example, when Metior in December 1966 was about to 
demonstrate its first machine it invited a representative from Sparfrämjandet but none from Spadab.31  
The initial demonstration was planned for 11 January 1967 in Malmö. There were also plans to start testing 
the machines in Uppsala in January or February the same year. Whether the demonstration and subsequent tests 
actually took place according to plans is unclear but it can be established that the first Swedish cash machine was 
made operational and shown to the press on 6 July 1967 in Uppsala. This was only nine days after the first British 
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cash machine was operational by Barclays Bank and De La Rue, and a couple of days before Svenska 
Handelsbanken showed their first Metior machine.  
After some months of testing, the general public could start to use the cash dispenser in Uppsala 24 hours a 
day in September 1967. The first machine had some problems and it took some time to get them sorted and have the 
machine operational most of the time.  
In early 1968 Metior had manufactured five machines. Metior still called them prototypes and of these five 
machines, the savings banks had two and the commercial banks three. In the spring of 1968,  mass production began 
as a result of Sparfrämjandet ordering 20 machines. This order included a number of specific requirements, 
indicating that the savings banks actively contributed to shape the new technology.32  
Some 20 machines were also delivered to Switzerland and one to the Netherlands. Each machine sold at 
58,000 to 59,000 SEK. About a year later, in April 1969, the Swedish savings banks ordered Metior cash dispensers 
for 1.8 million SEK, Metior’s biggest order so far.33 By February 1970, Metior had delivered 37 cash dispensers for 
the Swedish market, of which 24 had been bought by savings banks.34 At the same time, Metior had exported 141 
cash dispensers. For instance, Metior had achieved a dominating position in Switzerland, where De La Rue had left 
the market, and was about to enter the French market in collaboration with Transac, a division of Compagnie 
Industriella des Telecommunications (CIT). 
The first cash dispenser went under the name ‘utbetalningsautomat’ and later ‘Bankomat’. However this 
name was soon acquired by Svenska Handelsbanken and the commercial banks as the brand name for their 
dispensers. During its initial years Metior developed four generations of cash dispensers.35 The first generation was 
not sold commercially. The second and third were developed for the savings banks and the fourth was designed for 
the commercial banks and the French market.  
Bankomat Mark 2 and 3 were made of steel and had punched holes for identification, while in the UK 
Chubb’s plastic card had punched holes, Barclay-De La Rue used a cheque-sized voucher with a magnetic stripe and 
Speytec-Burroughs’ pastic card had a magnetic stripe on the back (Bátiz-Lazo and Reid 2008). Bankomat Mark 4 
used a card with information embedded in a magnetic stripe that had been developed by the French Société General 
de Automation.36 To withdraw money from the Metior machines a PIN-code was used together with the card. 
Whereas UK banks had been adamant not to deploy machines until their security had been tested (Bátiz-
Lazo and Reid 2008), some years after the first Swedish machines were being used the security of the system 
became an issue. Withdrawals using fake cards started to appear. Someone had discovered the algorithm used to 
associate card numbers with the PIN-code. One Easter holiday someone travelled around Sweden, withdrawing 
money from each machine they visited. This lead Metior to contact Bofors to help with the security issues. The co-
operation lead to Bofors buying 80 percent of Metior’s shares on 31 August 1969.37 However, Bofors’ interest and 
competence on these security issues regarding cash dispenser were insufficient. New problems, of such magnitude 
that the savings banks considered to close down its whole fleet of Metior machines, were reported in October 
1971.38 As a result Bofors sold control of Metior to ASEA in 197X.39 
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Interesting to note is that the Easter holiday incident lead to a change in the internal regulations of the 
savings banks. Before the incident the retail branch that had the dispensers was solely responsible for losses that 
might arise. This was changed after the incident so that all savings banks collectively shared any losses from 
resulting from the malfunction of cash machines.  
Already at an early stage, in August 1968, Metior delivered the first machine to be connected on-line to the 
Malmö computer centre. The second to fourth generations of Bankomats were all possible to connect on-line via 
modem and Mark 4 also to a call system.40 However, most cash machines at the savings banks operated as stand 
alone, off-line machines.  
A turning point came in 1971 as a result of two developments. First commercial banks within the Swedish 
Bankers Association, the post office and the Federation of Swedish Rural Credit Societies set up the Automatic Cash 
Dispenser Center.41 The aim of this independent company was to install and run cash dispensing equipment for the 
consortia, determine where the machines would be located, market its services (under the Bankomat brand) and 
administer card registration, data processing, clearing and statistical information. In November 1972, 15 Asea-
Metior cash machines were made operational for the consortia in Stockholm. In 1973, 13 machines were deployed in 
Gothenburg and one more in Stockholm. The following year 10 more dispensers became operational in Stockholm. 
By 1974, the savings banks remained outside of the consortia which, at the same time, aimed to deploy a total of 100 
machines throughout Sweden to service 1.8 million direct payroll deposit accounts. Between November 1972 and 
January 1974, banks in the Automatic Cash Dispenser Center consortia issued 29, 443 cash machine cards and 
dispensed some Skr 66 million (US$ 14.54 million), with an average withdrawal equal to SKr 268 (US$59).  
A second important development took place when the new director of Spadab, Jan Rydh, attended the 
Automated Teller Machine Conference in Chicago in 1971. Rydh reminisced that during discussions dwelling on 
investments in off-line dispensers on the fringes of the conference, out of impulse he made the sudden decision to 
regard investments in off-line machines a sunk (i.e. irrecoverable) cost (Thodenius 2008). The decision was 
communicated to colleagues attending the conference and upon their return to Sweden, engineers at Spadab were 
free to start what became the Minuten project. The aim of this project was the adoption of on-line cash dispensers by 
the savings banks. In searching for potential suppliers contacts were made with a number of manufacturers of cash 
dispensers and in the end three companies competed for the project. These were the Swedish company Asea-Metior, 
the British company Chubb and the US-based Docutel. As a result of the deliberations, the savings banks finally 
abandoned Metior in 1975 by choosing Docutel as their suppliers of ATM devices (that is, on-line cash machines).  
There are several competing explanations behind the move by the savings banks to abandon Metior.  But 
one major factor was the weak US dollar at that time which made the Asea-Metior dispenser more costly than the 
Docutel machine (Thodenius 2008, 22). Installation and service in Sweden was to be handled by Datasaab. This 
engineering company was at the start of their collaboration with Leif Lundblad and his Stockholm-based Inter 
Innovation company. Lundblad had developed its own cash dispensing mechanism to accommodate the differences 
between dollar notes and European currencies. The experience Datasaab had of the Docutel machines combined 
with Lundblads dispensing mechanism led to decision to develop a Datasaab ATM. However, before a working 
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machine had been presented Datasaab became a part of Ericsson Information Systems. A number of machines were 
produced and installed in a number of countries.  
The savings banks were the first to use this new generation of ATMs. These ATMs were initially known as 
mini-banks and ‘Minuten’ and the first machine was installed on May 24, 1977 in the city of Falun. In total, 600 
Docutel machines were installed (Wentzel 1996). All Minuten machines were from the beginning connected OLRT. 
In 1982 Spadab searched the market for a new generation of ATMs. Spadab wanted to buy 1,000 new ATMs. The 
machine that Datasaab had started to develop did not fulfil the demands of Spadab. Instead, Ericsson contacted 
Omron and in 1984 a contract was signed and the new ATMs could start do de be deployed. In total, 900 ATMs of 
this type were delivered to the savings banks. 
The Minuten network competed with that which built around commercial banks (called ‘Bankomat’). In 
later years clearing agreements between the two networks allowed bank customers using each others’ network. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Edgerton (2006:xvii, 3) has made claims about the need to move away from innovation-centric chronologies, that is, 
to avoid assuming that the impact of technology comes with innovation and early use. However, ‘first use’ is a 
relative concept. In this paper we document the creation of electronic data processing networks in British and 
Swedish savings banks while presenting a running comparison of similar developments in the USA.  We explored 
how constellations of otherwise independent providers came together to achieve scale while adopting on-line, real-
time (OLRT) computer technology. We provided details as to how savings banks in the East cost of the USA were 
the ‘first’ to adopt OLRT computing. But this meant relatively little for the first OLRT system in Swedish and 
British savings banks. This partly because they populated independent retail finance markets, each characterised by 
its own institutions, regulation and competitive dynamics. 
We made a perhaps unusual distinction between on-line and OLRT systems. This distinction begs the 
question, when is on-line not real-time processing? When considering the processing of data within the central 
processing unit then OL is always OLRT. Indeed banks with a geographically concentrated retail branch network 
and relatively low volume of transactions took steps to wire terminals and cash machines with their computer centre 
(either physically or through modems and conventional telephone lines). This was the case of savings banks and co-
operative banks in the East cost of the USA as well as savings banks in Manchester and Malmö.  
However, here we also presented a number of examples in Europe where on-line terminals sitting on retail 
bank tellers and cash machines were not OLRT. This as through the wall cash machines updated customer records 
after the transaction had taken place (in order to avoid long delays and reduce customers’ convenience) or as a result 
of organizational procedures, transactions were stored and batched together so central files were updated once or 
twice per day. The early on-line system at the TSB also showed how early computer technology could reach 
capacity quite easily (at least as far as transaction volume requirements of banks were concerned). These 
transactions also characterised as relatively simple and quite standard (i.e. the TSB have been characterised as a 
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single product financial intermediary, see further Bátiz-Lazo and Maixé-Altés 2009b). ‘“[Balance” between input, 
output, storage devices and main frame equipment was far more important than inherent speeds and capabilities of 
individual components... there was little sense to pay for equipment twenty-four hours a day when the equipment 
would be employed for a much shorter period of time.’ (Sanders 1963, , 708-9). Understandably bureau services 
were an attractive solution on both sides of the Atlantic. Not only to address issues relating to sharing the cost of 
capital equipment and lack of technical skills but also as a way to work together and address concerns regarding 
reliability and security so that relations with retail customers remained unchanged or they were even strengthened. 
We also departed from the common assumption that the nature of response of retail financial intermediaries 
to regulatory change and new technology is a rather deterministic (e.g. Gardener, Howcroft and Williams 1999). 
This was achieved by documenting how managers dealt with organizational change (or absence of change) within 
constellations of the same organisational form in different geographies. As noted by Guerreiro Wilson (2008), in 
approaching new technology managers of British and Swedish savings banks required that the machine fit the work 
and not the other way around. Indeed, we document evidence telling how in an effort to maintain the custom of 
European banks, US computer manufacturers were ready to modify their equipment to suit their technical 
requirements and specifications. This further suggested the relative importance of European financial intermediaries 
for US computer manufacturers: when compared to the atomistic nature of American retail banking, large volume of 
transactions and retail branch networks in Europe resulted in low frequency but high value orders of computer 
equipment. This evidence does not negate the importance of developments in computer technology the USA 
(particularly of manufacturers such as IBM and Burroughs with were both suppliers of systems for the US military) 
but it does contests naïve assumptions about the origins of technological change in financial services which 
considers a “ …fact that many financial innovations originate in the U.S....”  (Frame and White 2009, , 2). 
In summary, we explore the first steps in the emergence of self service technology and the changes it 
brought about for consumers and organisations active in retail financial market while, at the same time, articulate an 
international comparison. The purpose being researching technology and corporate strategy in their social and 
historical context, that is, the dynamics of the design, construction, development, implementation and use 
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